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electricparadise 10-25-2005 11:29 PM

Somebody must care out there about what has happened to this country. Doesn't anybody see what SH%$ these people have done to us . And because they say they are CHRISTIANS you all fell for it .wELL THEY AREN'T .... AND 2000 OF OUR PEOPLE AND A HUNDRED THOUSAND OF IRAQIES HAVE DIED.......... And just because you didn't want gays and lesbians to marry. or women to have control over their own bodies. Hope he starts drinking ,so you can see the real person you voted into office.

mr belvedere 10-26-2005 01:46 AM

Couldn't leave your thread hanging bro. I for one appreciate your passion and anguish over this entire mess. The sad fact is (at least in my case), many of us don;t even know there is a war going on somewhere that we are involved with. I forget, caught up in my life, until something like this hits the news or you bring it up here. Whatever your opinion on our presence in Iraq, whatever your opinion of the current administration and their justifications for our presence in Iraq; the fact is, we must keep this in the forefront of every American's mind inorder to bring about the resolution of the issues and hastty return of our fighting men and women in that theater. It has become very obvious to me, that the powers that be learned nothing from our great sacrifice and loss in Vietnam, and feel content to watch happen again in the deserts of the middle east. I care. I'm upset. But I forget. But, this shouldn't be about politics et al; it should be about doing the right thing, every time we get the chance. And I for one say that we have done the "right thing" in Iraq, and now it's up to them. Good luck my friend. -Belvie

electricparadise 10-26-2005 08:01 AM

I "cut and pasted this " (not very well ) didn't get the authors and I apologize for that, it came from alternet I think. It is written better than my post.....and thanks king Belve ,Peace...........:This week in Iraq, we reached a heart-breaking milestone: the 2,000th American soldier died in combat, fighting what we now know was always a war of choice and ideological preference.

For those who opposed the invasion, it's a moment to mourn our impotence: millions of us around the world did our best to stop this bloody disaster before it started, but we failed.

The real human cost, of course, is far greater than 2,000. It includes the 198 members of the "coalition of the willing" who have died, almost 300 private contractors, 73 journalists, the 15,220 Americans who have been wounded, and the invisible dead from what the Guardian's Julian Borger called the "extraordinarily high number of accidents, suicides and other non-combat deaths in the ranks that have gone largely unreported in the media."

And then there's the sad fact that those deceased Americans and allies are a fraction of the number of Iraqi dead.

Extrapolating from a study of post-traumatic stress disorder published in the New England Journal of Medicine, 41,000 U.S. marines and army troops reported that they believed they had killed at least one Iraqi civilian in the 15 months following the 2003 invasion.

Estimates of Iraqi troops killed during the invasion range from 5,000 to as many as 45,000 projected by the Guardian. General Tommy Franks guessed it was 30,000.

While we're supposed to consider these "bad guys" and ignore their deaths, the majority were young men trying to escape poverty in a country with an unemployment rate as high as 70 percent during the sanctions regime.

The real human toll includes, too, the estimated 3,450 Iraqi police and security forces who have been killed in what is already a low-grade civil war. And according to Iraq Body Count, a website that gathers media accounts of civilian deaths, between 26,000 and 30,000 Iraqi civilians have died from coalition actions through Monday.

But even those totals are dwarfed by the number of dead -- by some estimates over a million -- caused by the U.N sanctions that started with Bush I, and continued under President Bill Clinton, whose Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, once described the effects of the sanctions on Iraq's children as "worth it."

And even when we include all of those lives lost, we still don't begin to scratch the surface of the real human costs of this war -- the permanent emotional scars that war inevitably leaves on all of its participants, victims and victors alike.

Public support for this war has been sustained by a willful ignorance of the damage being done. On some level, Americans need a sanitized view of conflicts like Iraq to keep their dream of America's righteousness alive. Sure, the newspapers, the White House and the Pentagon have refined their techniques of repressing the numbers of the dead in Iraq, but the truth is there's a public appetite for the version of events they offer.

It is the perception that we are prosecuting a war that is less than righteous -- far more than recurring images of flag-draped coffins -- that will sap public support. The dead U.S. soldiers, dead children, dead Iraqi civilians are all the result of the same thing: 14 years of remorseless and cynical policy conducted by an unaccountable government and abetted by a citizenry that will stay loyal so long as the real human cost remains hidden.



Kay 10-26-2005 05:04 PM

don't forget these #'s
http://vikingphoenix.com/news/stn/2003/911casualties.htm
http://vikingphoenix.com/photos/911-2003/911-2003-1.html

electricparadise 10-27-2005 03:26 PM

Oh by golly , I didn't make the connection!!!!!! wow ! You mean, ...no ...Say it isn't so......The Iraqies did this???? I thought for sure biladen was a Saudie. I mean his family was from Saudi Arabia so I just figured .he was from there too .****!
Help me out here Kay are you saying the people who attack us were from Iraq. Cause usually thats what you do ,you attack the country that the bad guys are from. can you enlighten me on why you posted that .Tell you what I'l go google this and if you would, please bring other facts into this.

numbersgame 10-28-2005 04:57 PM

Wow some people will never get it, it has nothing to do with a woman having control over her body first of all remember it took 2 to make that baby. Second it is believed that life begins a conception, if you believe that a baby inside a woman that has a heart beat and legs and arms and all of those other great features is a person then abortion is murder, but if you believe that it's not a person well thats your decision.


I WILL PUT THIS IN ALL CAPS FOR A REASON ELECTRIC HOW CAN YOU POSSIBLY BE OK WITH KILLING A BABY, BUT AGAINST A WAR THAT PROVIDES SO MANY PEOPLE WITH SO MUCH FREEDOM??? JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND ARE YOU SAYING KILLING BABIES IS OK BUT LEAVE ADULTS ALONG???


OK NEXT NO COUNTRY ATTACKED US ON 9-11 TERRORIST DID AND SAUDI ARABIA KICKED BIN LADEN OUT YEARS AGO AND STRIPED HIM OF HIS CITIZENSHIP DO YOUR HOMEWORK.

LAST ON SEPT 11TH EVERYONE SAID WHY DIDN'T WE DO SOMETHING BEFORE THIS HAPPENED, AND NOW THAT PRESIDENT BUSH IS DOING SOMETHING WITH THE APPROVAL OF CONGRESS BY THE WAY PEOPLE WON'T TO CRITIZE HIM. HE HAS TAKEN THE WAR TO THEM, HOW MANY TERRORIST ATTACKS HAVE WE HAD IN AMERICA SINCE 9-11. THATS WHAT I THOUGHT.

BP 10-28-2005 05:07 PM

Quote:
On 2005-10-28 16:57:00, numbersgame wrote:
Wow some people will never get it, it has nothing to do with a woman having control over her body first of all remember it took 2 to make that baby. Second it is believed that life begins a conception, if you believe that a baby inside a woman that has a heart beat and legs and arms and all of those other great features is a person then abortion is murder, but if you believe that it's not a person well thats your decision.


I WILL PUT THIS IN ALL CAPS FOR A REASON ELECTRIC HOW CAN YOU POSSIBLY BE OK WITH KILLING A BABY, BUT AGAINST A WAR THAT PROVIDES SO MANY PEOPLE WITH SO MUCH FREEDOM??? JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND ARE YOU SAYING KILLING BABIES IS OK BUT LEAVE ADULTS ALONG???


OK NEXT NO COUNTRY ATTACKED US ON 9-11 TERRORIST DID AND SAUDI ARABIA KICKED BIN LADEN OUT YEARS AGO AND STRIPED HIM OF HIS CITIZENSHIP DO YOUR HOMEWORK.

LAST ON SEPT 11TH EVERYONE SAID WHY DIDN'T WE DO SOMETHING BEFORE THIS HAPPENED, AND NOW THAT PRESIDENT BUSH IS DOING SOMETHING WITH THE APPROVAL OF CONGRESS BY THE WAY PEOPLE WON'T TO CRITIZE HIM. HE HAS TAKEN THE WAR TO THEM, HOW MANY TERRORIST ATTACKS HAVE WE HAD IN AMERICA SINCE 9-11. THATS WHAT I THOUGHT.


Ditto

caribbean tan man 10-28-2005 05:26 PM

ALL I WANNA KNOW IS BUSH GETTING THE OIL OR NOT? and to me it seems ridiculous to be in a war with a country just to better the same country that dosent want the help! i mean leave it up to the good ole USA to go help countries that hate us and send in our troops who need to buy ther own body armour while the government spends money fixing other countries.

BP 10-28-2005 05:34 PM

Has there ever been a perfect war? Any war ever go without unexpected twists? I wonder what threads would be on the internet for Veitnam, WWII,I,Civil War etc... I bet it would be alot of simialr issues debated from every campaign ever fought. Is one side of this issue right and the other wrong?

caribbean tan man 10-28-2005 05:42 PM

i just think it sucks plain and simple. seems to be a big waste of time and money. i mean people here can bearly afford gas and here we are dumping million dollar bombs on a country we will spend billions on fixing after the war!

numbersgame 10-28-2005 05:57 PM

How do you figure they don't want the help??? Also remember this is a you scratch my back I will scratch yours remeber Kuwait they gave us 400 Million in oil alone that doesn't count the cash after we were hit by Hurricane Katrina. Politics people politics, life is not always fair nor will it ever be.

caribbean tan man 10-28-2005 06:16 PM

hay im 29 and have no knowledge of those older wars and very little of this one just stating the way i see it. when i say they dont want help im sure some do but they are born and bred to hate us.i also dont think iraq has anything to scratch our back with! also never heard kuwait gave $$ after katrina thats new news 2 me

electricparadise 10-28-2005 08:08 PM

Okay here is some one that was there:2000 Dead: How Many Is Too Many?
By Mike Hoffman
When I left for the Middle East in February 2003 with a Marine artillery unit, I was told Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, had been assisting Al Qaeda, was partly responsible for 9/11 and was an imminent threat to the United States and Iraq’s neighbors.

We destroyed Iraq’s under-equipped and demoralized military – the imminent threat to our nation -- in a little over a month. Since the invasion, no weapons inspection team has found evidence of any weapons of mass destruction and the claims that Saddam Hussein was working with Al Qaeda have been shown to be nonsense. When I left Iraq for home in May 2003, after President Bush told us “Mission Accomplished,” 139 Americans had died.

After the invasion was over and the occupation began, Iraqis didn’t throw flowers and candy at our feet. Instead roadside bombs and ambushes awaited us down every street. The administration said we were about to turn a corner. We were told that once Saddam and his sons were captured or killed the insurgents would give up, demoralized by the loss of their leader; peace would reign. By the time Saddam was captured in December 2003, 463 Americans had died in Iraq.

The capture of Saddam had no effect, and daily attacks against American forces and Iraqi security forces continued. It was during this time that the bloody Shiite Rebellion occurred. This was some of the fiercest fighting yet in Iraq. Even with this rebellion happening, we were told there was still hope. Sovereignty would soon be handed over to the Iraqis and another corner would be turned. But we needed to stay and provide the Iraqis security until we could “officially” turn the country back over to them. This would empower the Iraqis and end the Insurgency. By then, June 2004, 958 had come home in boxes.

Most Iraqis didn’t seem to care they had sovereignty, since we still occupied their country. They were still without electricity and faced an average unemployment rate of 70%. Every time US soldiers walked outside the wire they were still taking their lives in their hands. Then, we were told, elections would fix this. The Iraqis would have their own government in place and begin drafting a constitution. This would demoralize the terrorists and end the fighting. On the day of the elections, January 30, 2005, the U.S. death toll was 1,537.

What’s wrong with this picture?

The first time we were told the war was over we had lost 139 American; now we have lost 2,000 American lives in Iraq. Time and time again we are told things are getting better, that we have “turned a corner.”

In the Viet Nam War we didn’t “turn corners;” instead policy makers talked about the “light at the end of the tunnel.” We know now that by 1968 President Johnson knew there was no light at the end of the tunnel; he knew his war was lost. The Pentagon Papers showed this; Robert McNamara admits it today. Over 22,000 American troops died in Viet Nam after 1968 in a war our leaders knew was hopeless and just piling up American and Asian bodies.

Again, there is no light at the end of the tunnel, and we’ve turned so many corners we’re going in circles. Our leaders know they can’t win this war, but, like Johnson and McNamara, they refuse to admit it to the American people. Meanwhile, our troops remain a huge provocative force in the region and each individual soldier a prized target. Failure to face this reality is exacerbating the current chaos in Iraq and preventing real regional diplomatic solutions.

So the question falls to ordinary Americans: How many more brave men and women are we willing to sacrifice before we force our leaders to bring the troops home? I pray that it does not take another 56,000 like it did in Viet Nam.


Mike Hoffman was a lance corporal in a Marine artillery unit during the invasion of Iraq. He is a member of Iraq Veterans Against The War.


electricparadise 10-28-2005 08:41 PM

To numnuts & bp, If mr president whose approvall rating is in the toilet had done his job,like find & kill bin ladden I wouldn't be so peeed! but he & his cronies(been reading the paper about Scooterlittle ones?)got us into war over lies ( when is that simple fact gonna sink into your pee pinkin brains) why do you think Scooter is gonna spend time in jail? They tried to deepsix someone who was critical about the lies they had cooked up.& he got caught lying to the grand jury. And I hope its the start of the complete meltdown of this whole administration.

As far as abortion goes ,isn't that between The woman & her Dr. And PLULEASE DON'T GIVE ME THAT CRAP OF HOW YOU ARE SO darn CONCERNED ABOUT THAT CHILD! HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU GONE TO A SINGLE MOTHER WHO DECIDED TO KEEP HER BABY AND OFFERED TO HELP,EITHER WITH BABY FOOD ,DIAPERS, WHATEVER..BUT HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU TALKED ABOUT THOSE LAZY PEOPLE ON WELFARE THAT ARE SUCKING US HONEST TAXPAYERS MONEY IN WELFARE CHECKS ,FOOD STAMPS AND MEDICADE HANDOUTS. AND BY GOD IF THEY COULDN'T AFFORD THAT RUGRAT THEY SHOULD HAVE KEPT THEIR LEGS TOGETHER!sO WHEN YOU TAKE IN A HOMELESS MOTHER ,WHEN YOU SUPPORT THE UNDER PRIVILAGE AND DEMAND A DECENT WAGE FOR ALL WORKERS. (WALMART STARTS THEIR WORKERS AT $6.30 FOR SOME POSITIONS,THATS THE RICHEST COMPANY ,FAMILY IN THE WORLD)( YOU SHOP THERE? SHAME ON YOU IF YOU DO)THEN AND ONLY THEN WILL WE HAVE A COMMON GROUND. TIL THAT TIME I STAND BY MY STATEMENTS!


BP 10-28-2005 08:46 PM

Quote:
On 2005-10-28 20:41:00, electricparadise wrote:
To numnuts & bp, If mr president whose approvall rating is in the toilet had done his job,like find & kill bin ladden I wouldn't be so peeed! but he & his cronies(been reading the paper about Scooterlittle ones?)got us into war over lies ( when is that simple fact gonna sink into your pee pinkin brains) why do you think Scooter is gonna spend time in jail? They tried to deepsix someone who was critical about the lies they had cooked up.& he got caught lying to the grand jury. And I hope its the start of the complete meltdown of this whole administration.

As far as abortion goes ,isn't that between The woman & her Dr. And PLULEASE DON'T GIVE ME THAT CRAP OF HOW YOU ARE SO darn CONCERNED ABOUT THAT CHILD! HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU GONE TO A SINGLE MOTHER WHO DECIDED TO KEEP HER BABY AND OFFERED TO HELP,EITHER WITH BABY FOOD ,DIAPERS, WHATEVER..BUT HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU TALKED ABOUT THOSE LAZY PEOPLE ON WELFARE THAT ARE SUCKING US HONEST TAXPAYERS MONEY IN WELFARE CHECKS ,FOOD STAMPS AND MEDICADE HANDOUTS. AND BY GOD IF THEY COULDN'T AFFORD THAT RUGRAT THEY SHOULD HAVE KEPT THEIR LEGS TOGETHER!sO WHEN YOU TAKE IN A HOMELESS MOTHER ,WHEN YOU SUPPORT THE UNDER PRIVILAGE AND DEMAND A DECENT WAGE FOR ALL WORKERS. (WALMART STARTS THEIR WORKERS AT $6.30 FOR SOME POSITIONS,THATS THE RICHEST COMPANY ,FAMILY IN THE WORLD)( YOU SHOP THERE? SHAME ON YOU IF YOU DO)THEN AND ONLY THEN WILL WE HAVE A COMMON GROUND. TIL THAT TIME I STAND BY MY STATEMENTS!



I can see why you do so much cut and pasting.

electricparadise 10-29-2005 03:53 AM

Great, if you can't defend your position or refute the facts ,attack the person, typical rebublican method .HMMMM sounds like you are like Scooter & the gang . Don't like what i say so you make fun of my syntac and the way I put sentences together. Here is something that I didn't cut and paste. We invaded a country that was not threating us. The Iraqies are going to be ruled by a religious group soon . Our leaders screwed up. it was done over oil. When women don't have control over their bodies they are like cattle. When people follow religious leaders and don't think for themselves they are like sheep. When a ruling party does not provide for ALL of the citizens it should be replaced . When you vote for some one over one issue who turns out to be noncompassionate, stupid in foriegn affairs, a panderer to the rich,a person who puts incompetant people in important positions, you should accept the blame .

numbersgame 10-29-2005 09:24 AM

Don't give me that crap about hard times I have been there and done that I grew up poor and my wife had it even worse so bad that the local church use to bring them food and christmas gifts. When we were 17 she got pregnant but guess what we all choose are own destiny we stuck it out and nobody gave us anything so no I don't give anything to "Wal-Mart workers" other than the fact I am sure I contribute every april 15th. They are unskilled labor. People seem to forget when they were 19 and going to parties with their friends I was working 80 hours a week so I could buy my first house, they wasted their money on the car with the big engine or big speakers thats not my fault. Again I say WE ALL CHOOSE OUR OWN DESTINY! I am by no way rich but I am very upper middle class but thats not because anybody gave me anything not even a chance I had to earn that to. And yes I do care about those babies because at 17 that decision could of been made so easy by us, but it wasn't we took the mature way about it. You see electric if you keep bailing people out they will never learn and my son made me grow up quick. Maybe more people should try having a little bit of repsonibility, but you democrats keep wanting to bail people out.


One more little thing when you are 50 or 60 maybe even older don't be jealous of the guy or lady who invested their money or bought real estate etc... while you went to the movies, eat out, wore the latest clothes or drove the newest cars, just remember what I said WE ALL CHOOSE OUR OWN DESTINY!

electricparadise 10-29-2005 09:55 AM

Well congradulations, you are part of the I got mine screw you crowd. Most people are 4 paychecks from being homeless, That includes you if you are honest with yourself.It takes one serious illness ,one accident and your so called middleclass utopia is history.Its not about responsibility ,its about reaching out,making the playing field level,not everyone is as smart,as knowledgable,as ruthless as you seem to be. Tell me , you are well off ,do you give back to the church that gave so much to your wifes family,without taking the tax credit???????Thought so. As far as "walmart workers" for every 250 employees they have in a community it cost you upper middle class tax payers a million bucks in social cost . want to get mad at some body ? Go and talk to the owners and demand they pay their workers a living wage . That will lower your tax bill . As far as destiny goes some are born rich some get flushed and some get swallowed, you are as bad as the Taliban in your own way ,telling people how to live.
and I am that age , and I am not jealous ,just sad that people like you are in charge ,the ones with no compassion , the ones with "I forge my own life" well youv'e been lucky so far little one. Land becomes worthless, stocks fail , and goverments become corrupt.

















numbersgame 10-29-2005 10:57 AM

I've been lucky??? huh luck is winning the lottery, or having someone pay for your education I have had nothing but hard work you should try it sometime. Sounds like you are a little jealous to use your quote "if you be honest with yourself".



To reply to your comment about Mr. Libby my first question is did you even know who he was a week ago and be honest? Next be careful about throwing stones because Clinton was charged with the same crimes.

electricparadise 10-29-2005 01:06 PM

To answer the Libby question ....yes . And oh yeah bring up Clinton, lets see what did he lie about......Oh yeah getting a blowjob from someone other than his wife.
And I'm sure YOU ,being an upstanding Rebublican Christian(who didn't answer MY question about giving to the church by the way) was never ,or know of anybody in your religious circle, that lied about an affair. Nope not the Pious people of the right. Shame on Mr, Clinton .Dud did he take a country to war over lies.( with the help of Mr. Libby). Did he smear someone by outting his wife ,a CIA operative,which is what LIbby did and then lied of his part in it to the grand jury.Which is what lIbby is charged with ,among other things.Did the Main LIes ,which Libby was in on from the first, the WMD sh&t, cause any deaths???? Did Clintons lies cause any deaths ? ONly the ones Monica swallowwed(you believe in half of a human being)What Clinton did was between two people ,three if you count his wife. The lies libby & COmpany (Chenney /bush/Rove/Powell etc...)told has affected millions,And I don't want that crapp ....oh but the Iraqies are free . Wasn't our business. Cause if that was the case we'd be in 67 other countries.
Again , Have you helped out a single mother that kept her baby instead of aborting it? Better question ....how many people would have helped the mother of your child if you hadn'd been there(and my hat is off to you for being there) think about it ,if you had been born 15 yrs earlier you 'd have been in the great Viet Nam war, where we were fighting the bad commies in the rice paddies. Not this little war on terrorists, that the country hasn't sacrificed anything from their pocket book. Only blood from the kids that swallowed (like monica) the lies put out by Libby.(agAin for the people that don't get it.... NO WMD)btw IT HAS BEEN OVER 1400 DAYS SINCE bush SAID HE WAS GOING TO GET BENLADDEN FOR THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK. 1400 days!!!!

numbersgame 10-29-2005 01:33 PM

Wrong Wrong Wrong Libby is not charged with outing a CIA agent you dumba#$ he is charged with obstruction of justice for how he said he heard about it. And yes I do give to church as well as charity but only money I can follow since so many of them waste it or just give themselves raises. All the years you have had on this earth and you still have not figured out how the world works. And no I haven't helped a mother stop from getting an abortion of course to my knowledge I also don't know any that have. But yes there proabley are some but they have just hide it well.


Don't forget 9-11 was not the 1st attack on the world trade center maybe if Clinton had got Bin Laden then there would not have been a second.

numbersgame 10-29-2005 02:18 PM

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/04/katrina/main815171.shtml


here is a link caribbean tan shows how much Kuwait gave us after Katrina.

electricparadise 10-29-2005 02:55 PM

And maybe if we hadn't helped ben ladden back in the 80's or supplied saddam back in the 80s Clinton wouldn't be blamed ,do you forget, Bush was the one not paying attentioned in the months leading up to 9-11, not clinton .I can see it now, fifty years from now what ever the problem....."well if Clinton the lying president had just................"whatever.


DumbA$$????????????????

and who doesn't see the big picture here ? What the **** was LIbby lying about ?Another blowjob????

Again, the question is.... Have you helped a woman who has kept a child?? I'l make it easy on you . A single girl under 20 yrs. of age , nice girl like your wife was, only she didn't have a nice guy like you that stuck around, look for one,she won't be married ,then help her, then maybe....just maybe I will listen to your arguments. And don't tell me there aren't any poor single women where you are, **** man, try the food section at walmart,should find one there.
You also didn't reply to how many people ,out side of your wife's family do you think would have helped her (maybe yours), with out looking down on her with scorn ,cause she didn't wait to open her legs til after she was married. And if you say lots in her church ....you would be lying.
Also , do you give like our "born again "leader? he gives under 2 percent( think the bible asks for 10)
finally what does the first attack have to do with ben ladden? He bombed over seas embassies & the uss cole, and if you remember when he,Clinton, sent crusie misslles at benladdens camps,he was chastied by the press as being a coward. He,clinton also warned BUsh about benladden, and bush ignored him & so did Rice, our national security advicer.

Kay 10-30-2005 09:03 AM

Quote:
On 2005-10-27 15:26:00, electricparadise wrote:
Oh by golly , I didn't make the connection!!!!!! wow ! You mean, ...no ...Say it isn't so......The Iraqies did this???? I thought for sure biladen was a Saudie. I mean his family was from Saudi Arabia so I just figured .he was from there too .****!
Help me out here Kay are you saying the people who attack us were from Iraq. Cause usually thats what you do ,you attack the country that the bad guys are from. can you enlighten me on why you posted that .Tell you what I'l go google this and if you would, please bring other facts into this.

I did a search on Iraqi support for bin Laden's network and
739,000 links came up. here are a few. If you need more let me know.


http://limitedgovernment.org/publications/pubs/FandO/FOMay02.pdf#search='Iraqi%20support%20fo r%20bin%20Laden%27s%20network'

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1507859/posts

http://www.nydailynews.com/10-18-2004/news/wn_report/story/243421p-208691c.html


http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/12/03/1acover.htm

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/05/08/national1016EDT0560.DTL



caribbean tan man 10-31-2005 10:07 AM

im out this is way over my head! i think you guys should take it down a few notches also. your fighting over something none of use are going to change or end!

numbersgame 10-31-2005 11:25 AM

Caribbean you are correct neither one of us will end it. But no name calling just a few facts.

1. Clinton was charged with the same charges as Libby is charged and lying is lying they are both wrong.

2. Bush had been in office for 8 months when 9-11 happened, the planning for these attacks took years that would of had been under Clinton's adminstration.

3. Sometimes people have to make sacrifices for the good of future generations, if other countries had not helped us we would still be under control of a King.

4. If anyone thought Bin Laden was an immediate threat and Bush was ignoring it then they should of called an emergency hearing of Congress, not one person did that. No one held a press confrence nothing nobody did anything.

Electric I just have a hard time understanding your logic please open my eyes u seem to be ok with abortion (in other words killing a baby), but against a soldier dying in the name of freedom. I think both are horrible but I can atleast understand the losing of a soldier. And I did serve my country 1997-2003. Did you???

electricparadise 10-31-2005 11:15 PM

Medivac pilot 1969 . and you ?

mr belvedere 10-31-2005 11:35 PM

I for one, applaud all of the participants on this thread. Heated, passionate, intelligent debate; rather than the meaningless bickering I see on so many other sites. Keep the facts and postions coming I say. Great dialog! -Belvie

Kay 11-01-2005 07:24 AM

Quote:
On 2005-10-31 23:15:00, electricparadise wrote:
Medivac pilot 1969 (4yrs active plus 22 in the guard).WANT TO SWAP MEDALS? When did you find out you wanted control over a woman? I fought in one stupid war , don't think we should be in this stupid war brought to us by liars. BTW ONE FINAL FACT NO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION!!!!!!!!!!!!,THAT WAS THE REASON WE WENT TO WAR WITH IRAQ.........DUH! ANOTHER FACT, THE PRES. WAS A CHICKEN SH%T DURING VIET NAM.

_________________

“ IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION”

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm#06

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf#search='IRAQ%20WEAPONS%2 0OF%20MASS%20DESTRUCTION'

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm



[ This Message was edited by: electricparadise on 2005-10-31 23:17 ]

[ This Message was edited by: electricparadise on 2005-10-31 23:23 ]

[ This Message was edited by: electricparadise on 2005-10-31 23:31 ]

Athens Rose 11-01-2005 09:11 AM

Quote:
On 2005-10-26 01:46:00, mr belvedere wrote:
Couldn't leave your thread hanging bro. I for one appreciate your passion and anguish over this entire mess. The sad fact is (at least in my case), many of us don;t even know there is a war going on somewhere that we are involved with. I forget, caught up in my life, until something like this hits the news or you bring it up here. Whatever your opinion on our presence in Iraq, whatever your opinion of the current administration and their justifications for our presence in Iraq; the fact is, we must keep this in the forefront of every American's mind inorder to bring about the resolution of the issues and hastty return of our fighting men and women in that theater. It has become very obvious to me, that the powers that be learned nothing from our great sacrifice and loss in Vietnam, and feel content to watch happen again in the deserts of the middle east. I care. I'm upset. But I forget. But, this shouldn't be about politics et al; it should be about doing the right thing, every time we get the chance. And I for one say that we have done the "right thing" in Iraq, and now it's up to them. Good luck my friend. -Belvie


You hit it right on the head with this one. Well said.

numbersgame 11-01-2005 11:02 AM

Electric did you volunteer on get drafted? Just asking because most people think they are something because they went to war but truth is they didn't have much of a choice. As time goes on you will see more and more politicians with no military experience because of this. Of course that is the way it is supposed to be our country is supposed to be ran by civilians.

To answear your question electric I don't want control over a womans body, just the save babies but it takes one to get the other.

Lets try my question

How is it ok to kill a baby but not ok for a soldier to die in the name of freedom.

You see I could see your point if you were ok with abortion and ok with the war or if you were not for either one, but I don't see how a babies life is less precious than a grown adult who volunteered for their situation.

toilettan 11-01-2005 11:28 AM

2000peopl ded in a war is nota lot. 2000people ded after the war was ended by george bush is not good.

ALOHATANCA 11-01-2005 01:24 PM

lets stop the name calling , especially you Electric or the thread will be trashed...

electricparadise 11-01-2005 02:56 PM

little history ,mr national guards man (hope that is not name calling.) A person got drafted for two years. (see how long I was on active duty.) BTW 2/3 of the men who served in VN volunteered. And I really didn't see any different in the fighting skills. I will say this ....didn't see any natioal guard people over in VIET NAM. but I am sure they would have gone if called ...........but see, thats why they joined the guard.....very little chance of them going. But the MONITOR is right its bad to call someone a chicken..... and I do trully say I am sorry that My president was a national guardmember, he really really wanted to defend his country with all his heart ....thats why he joined the guard.....

You keep saying our soldiers are dying for freedom. I am saying they are dying over lies,propaganda,and cherry picked intelligence. this quote is from a couple of paragraphs below but it shows the thinking of the administration, in case you don't like to read everything: "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration,"


The New York Times had to say they were sorry for some of their reports on WMD,(which turned out to be false) most of which were written by J. MIller,The links I have are
the most up to date ones I could find.

The ones "Kay" posted are the same ones that were used to go to war .IE: read about C. Powells take now on his speach at the U.N. His aide decamp has been talking about it,how he got taken in.

www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7634313/
writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20030606.html
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4169107.stm - 43k - Oct 30, 2005

www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/articles/A13433-2004Oct6.html
The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."




mr belvedere 11-02-2005 01:01 AM

Stop doing that. Thanks.

mr belvedere 11-02-2005 01:05 AM

Quote:
On 2005-11-01 09:11:00, Athens Rose wrote:
Quote:
On 2005-10-26 01:46:00, mr belvedere wrote:
Couldn't leave your thread hanging bro. I for one appreciate your passion and anguish over this entire mess. The sad fact is (at least in my case), many of us don;t even know there is a war going on somewhere that we are involved with. I forget, caught up in my life, until something like this hits the news or you bring it up here. Whatever your opinion on our presence in Iraq, whatever your opinion of the current administration and their justifications for our presence in Iraq; the fact is, we must keep this in the forefront of every American's mind inorder to bring about the resolution of the issues and hastty return of our fighting men and women in that theater. It has become very obvious to me, that the powers that be learned nothing from our great sacrifice and loss in Vietnam, and feel content to watch happen again in the deserts of the middle east. I care. I'm upset. But I forget. But, this shouldn't be about politics et al; it should be about doing the right thing, every time we get the chance. And I for one say that we have done the "right thing" in Iraq, and now it's up to them. Good luck my friend. -Belvie
Awwwww! Doll, you flatter me way too much!

You hit it right on the head with this one. Well said.

natomastan2 11-02-2005 01:45 AM

But ...when Bush said we were going to war I bought Haliburton stock 10k. In 1.5 years made 40k buying and selling. You just have to know who is corrupt, then buy the stock.

mr belvedere 11-02-2005 01:54 AM

Profit isn't evil, it's how you go about it. Sleep well, if you can. -Belvie

clubtan1 11-02-2005 01:16 PM

It is interesting to note that, in the human history of the world, only the names and faces change. It would seem that, as humans, we never can get it right. Years ago I had read somewhere that, since recorded time, there has only been one full day that there was no war or conflict happening somewhere on this planet. Wish I could remember what day that was. Really sad when you think about it that way. What do you think that says about all of us humans? If you believe in a supreme being, what do you feel "IT" thinks about all of us collectivley as humans? And don't ask "IT" that question either. Might pi$$ "IT" off if you remind "IT" that WE can't all get along.

Kay 11-02-2005 02:31 PM

I think it was best said in the movie The Terminator 2

“It is within your nature to destroy yourselves”


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