11-01-2005, 12:02 PM | #31 (permalink) |
Join Date: Sep 2 2005
Posts: 6
Rep Power: 0 | Electric did you volunteer on get drafted? Just asking because most people think they are something because they went to war but truth is they didn't have much of a choice. As time goes on you will see more and more politicians with no military experience because of this. Of course that is the way it is supposed to be our country is supposed to be ran by civilians. To answear your question electric I don't want control over a womans body, just the save babies but it takes one to get the other. Lets try my question How is it ok to kill a baby but not ok for a soldier to die in the name of freedom. You see I could see your point if you were ok with abortion and ok with the war or if you were not for either one, but I don't see how a babies life is less precious than a grown adult who volunteered for their situation. |
11-01-2005, 03:56 PM | #34 (permalink) |
Waiting Confirmation Join Date: Dec 4 2002
Posts: 180
Rep Power: 0 | little history ,mr national guards man (hope that is not name calling.) A person got drafted for two years. (see how long I was on active duty.) BTW 2/3 of the men who served in VN volunteered. And I really didn't see any different in the fighting skills. I will say this ....didn't see any natioal guard people over in VIET NAM. but I am sure they would have gone if called ...........but see, thats why they joined the guard.....very little chance of them going. But the MONITOR is right its bad to call someone a chicken..... and I do trully say I am sorry that My president was a national guardmember, he really really wanted to defend his country with all his heart ....thats why he joined the guard..... You keep saying our soldiers are dying for freedom. I am saying they are dying over lies,propaganda,and cherry picked intelligence. this quote is from a couple of paragraphs below but it shows the thinking of the administration, in case you don't like to read everything: "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," The New York Times had to say they were sorry for some of their reports on WMD,(which turned out to be false) most of which were written by J. MIller,The links I have are the most up to date ones I could find. The ones "Kay" posted are the same ones that were used to go to war .IE: read about C. Powells take now on his speach at the U.N. His aide decamp has been talking about it,how he got taken in. www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7634313/ writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20030606.html news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4169107.stm - 43k - Oct 30, 2005 www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/articles/A13433-2004Oct6.html The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies. Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991." |
11-02-2005, 02:05 AM | #36 (permalink) |
Mr. b Join Date: May 10 2005 Age: 55
Posts: 7,247
Rep Power: 69 | Quote: On 2005-11-01 09:11:00, Athens Rose wrote: Quote: On 2005-10-26 01:46:00, mr belvedere wrote: Couldn't leave your thread hanging bro. I for one appreciate your passion and anguish over this entire mess. The sad fact is (at least in my case), many of us don;t even know there is a war going on somewhere that we are involved with. I forget, caught up in my life, until something like this hits the news or you bring it up here. Whatever your opinion on our presence in Iraq, whatever your opinion of the current administration and their justifications for our presence in Iraq; the fact is, we must keep this in the forefront of every American's mind inorder to bring about the resolution of the issues and hastty return of our fighting men and women in that theater. It has become very obvious to me, that the powers that be learned nothing from our great sacrifice and loss in Vietnam, and feel content to watch happen again in the deserts of the middle east. I care. I'm upset. But I forget. But, this shouldn't be about politics et al; it should be about doing the right thing, every time we get the chance. And I for one say that we have done the "right thing" in Iraq, and now it's up to them. Good luck my friend. -Belvie Awwwww! Doll, you flatter me way too much! You hit it right on the head with this one. Well said. |
11-02-2005, 02:16 PM | #39 (permalink) |
Join Date: Jan 31 2005
Posts: 2,114
Rep Power: 57 | It is interesting to note that, in the human history of the world, only the names and faces change. It would seem that, as humans, we never can get it right. Years ago I had read somewhere that, since recorded time, there has only been one full day that there was no war or conflict happening somewhere on this planet. Wish I could remember what day that was. Really sad when you think about it that way. What do you think that says about all of us humans? If you believe in a supreme being, what do you feel "IT" thinks about all of us collectivley as humans? And don't ask "IT" that question either. Might pi$$ "IT" off if you remind "IT" that WE can't all get along. |
Bookmarks |
Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests) | |
Thread Tools | |
| |
Similar Threads | ||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
looking for 2000 or newer suncapsule and 2000 or newer beds | sunworx salon | For Sale - FOR SALON OWNERS ONLY | 1 | 01-04-2005 01:32 PM |
All about the COPYRIGHT by: Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2000. | cabosuntanning | Tanning Salon Management | 3 | 07-10-2003 05:01 PM |
Changing from ME to 2000 | Sonshinetans | Technology Forum | 8 | 04-12-2003 10:58 AM |
Let me set the record staright! | Soakinuptherays | Say What ????? | 10 | 12-03-2001 10:25 PM |