electricparadise

little history ,mr national guards man (hope that is not name calling.) A person got drafted for two years. (see how long I was on active duty.) BTW 2/3 of the men who served in VN volunteered. And I really didn't see any different in the fighting skills. I will say this ....didn't see any natioal guard people over in VIET NAM. but I am sure they would have gone if called ...........but see, thats why they joined the guard.....very little chance of them going. But the MONITOR is right its bad to call someone a chicken..... and I do trully say I am sorry that My president was a national guardmember, he really really wanted to defend his country with all his heart ....thats why he joined the guard.....

You keep saying our soldiers are dying for freedom. I am saying they are dying over lies,propaganda,and cherry picked intelligence. this quote is from a couple of paragraphs below but it shows the thinking of the administration, in case you don't like to read everything: "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration,"


The New York Times had to say they were sorry for some of their reports on WMD,(which turned out to be false) most of which were written by J. MIller,The links I have are
the most up to date ones I could find.

The ones "Kay" posted are the same ones that were used to go to war .IE: read about C. Powells take now on his speach at the U.N. His aide decamp has been talking about it,how he got taken in.

www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7634313/
writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20030606.html
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4169107.stm - 43k - Oct 30, 2005

www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/articles/A13433-2004Oct6.html
The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."



The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."